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Abstract 
Article 24 of the Constitution prohibits the employment of 
children in hazardous environments. The provision is 
worded in a manner that allows horizontal application of 
the right guaranteed thereby. However, the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of India’s method of applying this 
horizontal right is obscure. On one hand, the Court in 
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India 
indulged in a direct horizontal application of the right 
conferred under the Article, while on the other hand, the 
Court in the case of M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, 
undertook a combined indirect horizontal and vertical 
application of the Article. This paper attempts to identify 
the exact manner of applicability of the right under 
Article 24, by tracing its development, with specific 
reference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
same. Further, this paper explores the possibility of 
reading the right against exploitation in a more inclusive 
manner, as has been done for right to life under Article 
21. The author has been inspired by the International 
community’s perception of child labour, specifically, the 
Constitution of Ireland and the Bill of Rights of South 
Africa, in putting forward arguments to augment the  
expansion of the scope of Article 24.   
Keywords: Article 21, Child labour, Comparative Constitutional 
Law, Purposive Interpretation, Right against Exploitation 
1. Introduction 
In order to delve into the application of fundamental rights, the 
most basic enquiry is to distinguish them as either ‘vertical’ or  
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 ‘horizontal’ in nature.1 While the vertical application of rights only 
compels the State to comply with them, horizontal application 
extends this requirement of compliance to private actors.2 The 
language of certain fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution, allows for horizontal application of those rights. For 
instance, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has, considering the 
language of Article 21, allowed the horizontal application of the 
‘right to life’ on various occasions.3 Another provision of the Indian 
Constitution, which is worded similarly, is Article 24. This Article 
aims to prohibit child labour in factories and other hazardous jobs.4 
However, unlike Article 21, which has been conferred direct 
horizontal application by the Supreme Court,5 the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 24 does not follow a uniform manner of 
application. This ambiguity is made amply clear when the holding 
in the People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India6 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘PUDR case’) is viewed alongside the 
holding in M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (hereinafter referred to 
as the ‘M. C. Mehta case’)7. In the former, the Supreme Court 
construed Article 24 in a directly horizontal fashion, and in the 
latter, the Supreme Court interpreted the Article using a 
combination of indirect horizontal and vertical.  
This paper attempts to determine the exact scope of the application 
of Article 24. To achieve the said goal, this paper will trace the 
development of the jurisprudence of Article 24, with specific 
reference to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the same.  
Further, this paper also explores the possibility of reading the right 
against exploitation under Article 24 in a broader manner as has 
been done for the right to life guaranteed under Article 21. To assist 
                                                          
1 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN 
CONSTITUTION 640 (Sujit Choudhry et al. eds. 2nd ed. 2016).  
2 Id. 
 3Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 179; 
Consumer Education & Research v. Union of India, AIR 1995(1) SC 637. 
4 INDIA CONST. Art 24. 
5 Indian Medical Association, 7 SCC 179; Consumer Education & 
Research, AIR 1995(1) SC 637. 
6 People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (1) 
456. 
7 M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6 SCC 756. 
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this analysis,  the paper takes inspiration from the international 
community’s perception of child labour, the Constitution of Ireland 
and the Bill of Rights of South Africa, the former having special 
indirect horizontal rights for children and the latter having laid 
great emphasis on the rights of the child. 
2. The Supreme Court and its Interpretation of Article 24 
Although the guarantee enshrined under Article 24 was included in 
the original text of the Indian Constitution under Article 18 of the 
Draft Constitution, 1948,8 cases concerning its interpretation have 
seldom come before the Supreme Court. The first time it did, was 
in the PUDR case.9 Though the case was primarily concerned with 
employment conditions of workers, it dealt with child labour as 
well. The Court observed that the constitutional prohibition under 
Article 24 must operate proprio vigore and it binds everyone by 
reason of its compulsive mandate. Justice Bhagwati identified two 
duties under Article 24 - the employers’ duty to not employ 
children below the age of fourteen in hazardous work; and the 
state’s duty to ensure that the employers don’t breach their 
aforementioned duty. It is apparent that the Court intended to 
allow a direct horizontal application of Article 24.  
Shortly after, the case of Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v. 
State of Jammu & Kashmir10 came before the Court for adjudication. 
This was the first instance wherein the Court conflated the rationale 
for prohibiting child labour in hazardous environment, with the 
importance of education. The Court conceded to the fact that a 
child dropping out of school in order to assist his/her family to 
make ends meet, was an economic problem. The employment of 
children was only prohibited in hazardous environments because 
the socio-economic condition of India did not allow the complete 
                                                          
8 Draft Constitution of India, 1948, Constituent Assembly Debates India, 
https://www.constitutionofindia.net/historical_constitutions/draft_co
nstitution_of_india__1948_21st%20February%201948. 
9 Indian Medical Association, 7 SCC 179; Consumer Education & 
Research, AIR 1995(1) SC 637. 
10 Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v. State of Jammu & 
Kashmir, AIR 1984 SC 177. 
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prohibition of child labour. The Court recognized that it was the 
Central Government’s duty to ensure the enforcement of Article 24. 
The Court suggested that the Central Government take 
responsibility for persuading workmen to send their children to 
school. Further, it was also held that the State was obligated to pay 
the school fees of such children and provide free books and other 
facilities like transportation etc. Essentially, the Court engaged in a 
vertical application of Article 24.  
In the case of Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children’s Aid Society11, the 
Court enquired whether the respondent could be classified as a 
‘State’ under Article 12 and whether such classification would 
determine whether the rights conferred under Articles 21 and 24 
could be enforced against the respondent. Previously, in the PUDR 
case12, the Court had identified that Articles 17, 23 and 24 were 
applicable against everyone. Thus, it was superfluous to determine 
if the respondent fell under the definition of ‘State’.  
Subsequently, in the M. C. Mehta case13, without reference to the 
Salal Hydro Project case14, the Court conflated the purpose of Article 
24, with the education of children. In this case, the Court was faced 
with the issue of child labour in the matchbox industry. According 
to the Court, child labour in hazardous places interfered with the 
education of children and was harmful to their mental and physical 
development. In its analysis, the Court read Articles 2415, 39(e)16 
and 39(f)17 together to find that the legislative intent behind the 
enactment of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 
1986 needs to be fulfilled. Interestingly, Articles 39(e)18 and 39(f)19 
expect the State to make policies for securing the health of workers 
and to provide children opportunities, to develop in a healthy 
                                                          
11 Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children’s Aid Society, AIR 1987 SC 656. 
12 People's Union for Democratic Republic v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (1) 
456. 
13 M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6 SCC 756. 
14 Salal Hydro Project, AIR 1984 SC 177. 
15 INDIA CONST. art. 24. 
16 INDIA CONST. art. 39(e). 
17 INDIA CONST. art. 39(f). 
18 INDIA CONST. art. 39(e). 
19 INDIA CONST. art. 39(f). 
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manner. The Court essentially conferred the State with a 
responsibility to ensure that the value under Article 24 is protected. 
This was clearly a vertical understanding of the text of Article 24. 
However, the Court did not stop here. Taking guidance from 
Articles 24, 39(e) and 39(f), it dictated that employers contravening 
the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1986 Act’) were liable to pay 
compensation for every child employed by them. The appointment 
of ‘inspectors’ is provided for in the 1986 Act20, to make certain that 
the payment of the said compensation is deposited in the Child 
Labour Rehabilitation-cum-welfare fund. Thus, by using the legal 
structure of the State to secure a fundamental right, the Court also 
engaged in indirect horizontal application of Article 24.  
The very next year, a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) was filed 
before the Supreme Court in order to prohibit the employment of 
children in the carpet industry. In this case, reported as Bandhua 
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India21, the petitioner contested that 
employment of children by carpet weavers of Uttar Pradesh was 
hazardous and thus, contrary to Article 24. The court stressed on 
the importance of children in the country’s social progress, 
economic development, and peace and order. It also took 
cognizance of the State’s responsibilities enumerated under Articles 
39(e), 39(f) and 45. It found a connection between poverty and child 
labour and as child labour deprives children of a meaningful right 
to live, leisure, food, and education, their right to life protected 
under Article 21 was infringed.  
This was followed by the case of State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High 
Court of Gujarat22 wherein the Court was faced with the question of 
minimum wages for prisoners. Although the case primarily dealt 
with the constitutionality of Article 23, the Court was of the 
opinion that inter alia Articles 17, 23 and 2423 were enforceable 
against all individuals, which necessarily bestowed a direct 
horizontal application to Article 24. A similar finding was 
                                                          
20 Section 17, Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, No. 61, 
Acts of Parliament, 1986. 
21 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1997) 10 SCC 549. 
22 State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, AIR 1998 SC 3164. 
23 INDIA CONST. 
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documented in the Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of 
Chemical Biology24, (hereinafter referred to as the P. K. Biswas case) 
wherein the court found that in case of violations of Articles 17, 23 
or 2425 by a private individual, the aggrieved party could directly 
approach the court under Article 32.26 
More than a decade after the case of State of Gujarat v. Hon’ble High 
Court of Gujarat, the Court was again faced with the question of 
interpreting Article 24 in the case of Childline India Foundation v. 
Allan John Waters.27 Though this case was a criminal matter, the 
Court read Articles 39(e), 39(f) and 4528 as being supplementary to 
Article 24. This brings forth the court’s intent to protect the 
fundamental right in a vertical fashion and to read it alongside 
dignity, personality and education of children. 
In Society of Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 
(hereinafter referred to as the Unaided Society case)29 the Court 
acknowledged that primary responsibility to protect child rights, 
lies with the State and it must:  
respect, protect and fulfil children's rights and has 
also got a duty to regulate the private institutions 
that care for children… Non-state actors exercising 
the state functions like establishing and running 
private educational institutions are also expected to 
respect and protect the rights of the child, but they 
are not expected to surrender their rights 
constitutionally guaranteed.30 
Private individuals were expected not to infringe upon the 
guarantee, but this expectation was subject to their own 
fundamental rights. Thus, as per the Court, there was a clear 
hierarchy of duties imposed upon the State and others.  
                                                          
24 Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 
SCC 111. 
25 INDIA CONST.  
26 INDIA CONST. art. 32. 
27 Childline India Foundation v. Allan John Waters, (2011) 6 SCC 261. 
28 INDIA CONST. 
29 Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1. 
30 Id. 
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While dealing with the case of Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of 
India,31 the Court noted a party’s argument regarding the fact that 
Articles 17, 23 and 2432 can be considered as recognition of 
horizontal rights under the Constitution. Similarly, in the case of 
India Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala (hereinafter 
referred to as the Young Lawyers case)33, the Court held that 
Articles 23, 24 and 25(1) enumerate rights that can be applied 
horizontally, to preserve the dignity of individuals.  
Furthermore, in its Daily Order dated January 4, 2018, in the matter 
of National Commission of Child Rights v. Rajesh Kumar,34 the Court, 
while citing the M. C. Mehta35 case, noted that child rights were 
sacred and that it is children who shall form the future of the 
country. The Court opined that the State has a great role insofar as 
protection of child’s rights is concerned. Thus, the Court’s 
interpretation seems to be to make the State primarily liable for 
guaranteeing that Article 24 is not violated. 
From the analysis provided, it can be concluded that the Supreme 
Court has, time and again, found merit in the argument of applying 
Article 24 in a direct horizontal fashion.  However, insofar as the 
primary duty of protecting the rights under the Article is 
concerned, the Court has bestowed the same upon the State. 
Private individuals have either not been expected to uphold the 
constitutional mandate or have been subject to lesser duty than the 
State.  
The seven-judge constitutional bench in the P.K. Biswas36 case did 
find that in case of a violation of Article 24, the victim can approach 
the Court directly, i.e., it suggested direct horizontal application. 
The five-judge constitutional bench in the Young Lawyers case37 also 
                                                          
31 Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 2728. 
32 INDIA CONST. 
33India Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, 
MANU/SC/1094/2018. 
34 National Commission of Child Rights v. Rajesh Kumar, SLP 34251/17. 
35 M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 6 SCC 756. 
36 Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 
SCC 111. 
37 India Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala, 
MANU/SC/1094/2018. 
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had a similar finding to that of the P. K. Biswas38 case. That being 
said, substantial guidance regarding the nature of Article 24 and 
the rights and duties that flow out of it, can only be found in the 
three-judge bench decision of M. C. Mehta39 case. This results in the 
coexistence of two potentially irreconcilable legal positions – while 
the binding force of the constitutional benches dictate that Article 
2440 must be understood as a horizontal right, the three-judge 
bench has deployed a vertical understanding of Article 2441 and 
has, thus, devised comprehensive structures to ensure that the State 
protects the right under the Article.  
This conundrum can plausibly be resolved by the three-judge 
bench’s dictum in the Unaided Society42 case. The court, in that case, 
found that: a) even when the primary responsibility to protect the 
right under Article 2443 lay with the State, private actors 
performing state functions too, subject to their own constitutional 
rights, were expected to respect the right44 and  that b) legislation 
formulated in order to protect the rights under Article 2445, cast an 
obligation on non-state actors to protect and respect child rights.46 
A cumulative reading of these two suggests that the court 
visualized a sui generis direct horizontal application of Article 24 
against private actors performing state functions and indirect 
horizontal application of Article 24 against private actors in 
general. 
3. The International Community’s Perspective on Child 
Rights 
In order to get a holistic picture of the international community’s 
understanding of child rights and child labour, it is imperative to 
identify how the International Labour Organization (hereinafter 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 M. C. Mehta, (1996) 6 SCC 756. 
40 INDIA CONST. art. 24. 
41 Id. 
42 Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1. 
43 INDIA CONST. art. 24. 
44 Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan, (2012) 6 SCC 1. 
45 INDIA CONST. art. 24. 
46 Supra note 42.  
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referred to as the I.L.O.) and The United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (hereinafter referred to as the C.R.C.) perceive 
the same. India is a member of the former and a signatory to the 
latter, and is obligated to respect international law.47 
As far as the I.L.O. is concerned, several of its recommendations 
deal with the issue of child labour. Convention No. 13848 and 
Recommendation No. 14649, when read together, state that children 
should not be allowed to work at a young age (which should not be 
less than 18 years) and that national policies must provide for 
poverty alleviation and jobs for adults to ensure that their children 
do not become a part of the labour force.50 Recommendation No. 
14651 also entails free and compulsory education for children, 
vocational training, extension of social security, appropriate 
facilities for the protection of children, etc. Furthermore, 
Convention No. 182 and Recommendation No. 190 cumulatively 
stress on expanding the definition of ‘hazardous work’ to include 
work that exposes children to physical, psychological and sexual 
abuse as well.52 Exposure to hazardous substances, processes, 
noises and vibrations, long work hours, night shifts and 
unreasonable confinement in the premises of the employer too, 
would form a part of the term ‘hazardous work’.53 This expanded 
definition could, in the Indian context, bring work as domestic 
help, agricultural labourers, small-scale constructions workers and 
the like, under the definition of hazardous work for children. 
                                                          
47 INDIA CONST. art. 51. 
48 Minimum Age Convention, C138, International Labour Organization (Jun. 
26 1973), https:// www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/ f?p= NORML 
EXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312283:NO. 
49Minimum Age Recommendation, R146, International Labour 
Organization (Jun. 26 1973), https:// www.ilo.org/dyn/ normlex/ 
en/f?p =NORMLEXPUB:12100:0:: NO:12100:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ 
ID:312484:NO. 
50ILO Conventions and Recommendations on child labour, INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION, https://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/ ILO 
conventionsonchildlabour /lang--en/index.htm. 
51 Supra note 47. 
52Id. 
53Id. 
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The C.R.C. on the other hand, imposes multiple duties on the 
signatory States. The States are expected to act in the best interest of 
a child without compromising equality and freedom of the child.54 
States are further expected to respect the right to life of children.55 
The Convention also imposes the duty on the States to guarantee 
education, health, social security, etc. for the children.56The 
mechanism of implementing the obligations under the C.R.C. is 
supposed to be coordinated in both a vertical and a horizontal 
fashion.57 The C.R.C. calls on non-state actors to comply with the 
provisions, however, it is the State that has a primary role to 
respect, protect and fulfil the rights of children.58 Incidentally, the 
burden of implementing the obligations under the C.R.C. is similar 
to how the Supreme Court of India has implemented Article 2459 in 
the Unaided Society60 case, i.e. holding the State to be the primary 
guardian of the rights of children, while non-State actors have a 
similar duty which is of a lower magnitude.  
3.1. The Constitution of Ireland 
The jurisprudence surrounding the Irish Constitution can be 
referred to ameliorate the rationale to expand the scope of Article 
24 of the Indian Constitution. The Irish Supreme Court, prior to the 
insertion of Article 42A61, which specifically dealt with child 
rights62, had identified various rights of the child under Article 40.3 
of the Constitution63 in the case of FN v. Minister for Education.64 It 
                                                          
54 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
55 Id. at 6. 
56 Id. at 9. 




59 INDIA CONST. art. 24. 
60 Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1. 
61 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 42A. 
62 UCD Constitutional Studies Group, A Guide to the referendum on the 31st 
Amendment to the Constitution, UCD SCHOOL OF LAW, 
https://www.ucd.ie/t4cms/Guide_to_the_31st_amendment.pdf. 
63 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3. 
64 FN v. Minister for Education [1995] 1 IR 409. 
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interpreted the text of the Article in a broad manner, thus 
extending the State’s duty to “defend and vindicate the personal 
rights of the citizen” to the protection of various rights of the 
child.65 The Article was in place to essentially protect the personal 
rights of citizens. However, the Irish Supreme Court, in the matter 
of G v An Bord Uchtála66, expanded the scope of the Article to 
include the unenumerated rights of children to be fed, to be reared, 
to be educated, to have an opportunity to live a life of dignity as a 
human being, etc. Subsequently, in N v. The H.S.E.,67 these rights 
were made subservient to the rights of the family under Article 41 
and the rights were subsumed within the family structure, other 
than exceptional scenarios.68 Notwithstanding the supremacy of the 
family in dealing with the concerns of the child, the Court had 
clearly gone beyond the mere text of the Constitution, to ensure the 
well-being of children and in the process, it expanded the scope of 
Article 40.3.69  
Furthermore, as far as understanding of child rights is concerned, 
the requirement of protecting children’s rights was considered so 
important, that under Article 42.5 (now repealed vide the 31st 
Amendment), the State could have been compelled to supplant the 
role of the parents and vindicate the child’s rights, in case the 
parents fail in their duties.70 Thus, there was also a possibility for 
the child to bring a claim against the State, in case it fails to 
intervene, albeit, the standard of proof required to succeed in such 
a claim would be extremely high.71 As per the case of North-Western 
Health Board v. H.W.72, the State’s intervention was possible in 
instances like an immediate threat to the life or health of the child 
or an immediate threat to function as a human being, on account of 
dereliction of parental duties or neglect on part of the parents that 
                                                          
65 FN v. Minister for Education [1995] 1 IR 409. 
66 G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] 1 IR 32. 
67 N v. The H.S.E. [2006] 4 IR 375.  
68 N v. The H.S.E. [2006] 4 IR 375.  
69 Supra note 62. 
70 FN [1995] 1 IR 409. 
71 Aoife Nolan, Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic 
and social rights violations: Experiences and lessons from South Africa and 
Ireland, 12 ICON 61, 73 (2014). 
72North-Western Health Board v. H.W. [2001] 3 IR 635. 
Christ University Law Journal Vol. 9, No.2                                 ISSN 2278-4322 
48 
causes an abandonment of the child etc. While the Indian Supreme 
Court has found the State to hold duties towards children under 
Article 24, which are essentially supplementary duties,73 for 
instance, providing transport to children, paying their school fee 
and for their books, the Irish Supreme Court’s dictum all in all, 
makes the State duty-bound to stand-in for the parents and 
perform essential duties related to life and health of the child. Not 
only that, after the 31st Amendment to the Irish Constitution74, 
Article 42A provides for a Constitutional provision similar to 
Article 21A of the Indian Constitution.75 Article 42A seeks to ensure 
that the religious, moral, intellectual, physical and social education 
of children is guaranteed and the children are further entitled to a 
certain minimum education - moral, intellectual and social. It is 
apparent that the Irish Constitution attaches great importance to 
the education, mental and physical well-being of the children of the 
country.  
The sheer contrast between the positions of law in India and 
Ireland is thought provoking. On one hand, while Article 40.3 of 
the Irish Constitution only provided for protection of personal 
rights of citizens, the Irish Courts expanded its understanding to 
cater to not only the basic needs of children, but also to ensure that 
they lead a dignified life. On the other hand, the Indian Courts 
have interpreted Article 24 in a fashion that curtails its purpose to 
being a means to an end of education. This missed opportunity to 
expand child rights is further aggravated considering that Articles 
39(e)76, 39(f)77 and erstwhile Article 4578 of the Directive Principles 
of State Policy of the Indian Constitution, in actuality, provided for 
protection of child rights and dignity. Indian courts can definitely 
borrow from the Irish example to expand and emphasize child 
rights, especially under Article 24.  
                                                          
73 Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, AIR 
1984 SC 177. 
74 Thirty-first Amendment of the Constitution (Children) Act 2012, (Act 
No. C31/2012). 
75 INDIA CONST. art. 21A. 
76 INDIA CONST. art. 39(e). 
77 INDIA CONST. art. 39(f). 
78 INDIA CONST. art. 45. 
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3.2. The Bill of Rights of South Africa 
To develop a perspective on the importance of child rights, a 
reference to the law of South Africa can be made, as Section 28 of 
Bill of Rights of South Africa, provides for special rights to 
children.79 A child is defined as a person who is under the age of 18 
years and in matters concerning his or her right, the child’s best 
interest must take paramount importance.80 These special rights 
conferred upon children include the right to have a name, 
nationality and birth, to be cared for in a familial environment, 
basic nourishment, health, social services and shelter, etc.81 Not 
only do the children have special rights like basic nutrition, shelter, 
health care and social services, etc., as per the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa’s decision of Sonderup v Tondelli82, they also benefit 
from all the other rights provided in the Bill of Rights such as 
personal privacy, freedom of expression, freedom and security etc. 
The Constitutional Court, in S v M83, has comprehended Section 
2884 to be derived from the C.R.C., which has been interpreted to be 
the standard against which legislative measures and policies are to 
be measured. The wide formulation of Section 28(2)85 is, as per the 
Jooste v Botha86 case, “…so all-embracing that the interest of the 
child would override all other legitimate interests of parents, 
siblings and third parties”.  
The Children’s Act 201087 was enacted to reinforce and endorse the 
rights provided under Section 28.88 The Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007 complements 
                                                          
79 Nolan, Supra note 67 at 85. 
80 Id. at 86. 
81 Id.  
82 Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 1 SA 1171 (CC). 
83 S v M 2008 3 SA 232 (CC). 
84 Chapter 2 - Bill of Rights, Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, Republic of South Africa, https:// www.justice.gov.za/ 
legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng-02.pdf. 
85 Id. 
86 Jooste v Botha 2000 2 SA 199 (T). 
87 Children's Act 38 of 2010 (S. Afr.). 
88 R. Songca, Evaluating of Children's Rights in South African Law: The Dawn 
of an Emerging Approach to Children's Rights, 44 COMP. & INT'L L.J.S. AFR. 
340, 344 (2011). 
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the Children’s Act, 2010 to protect children from sexual offences. 
Further, the Child Justice Act, 2008 creates a whole different justice 
system for matters involving children, who are in conflict with the 
law.89 The object of the Child Justice Act, 2008 is to provide 
restorative justice to children, so that they can be reintroduced into 
the society. 
The plethora of South African legislations in place to protect the 
rights of children, is somewhat comparable to the stress the 
legislature of India has laid towards protection of children. The 
intention of the Indian legislature becomes evident on viewing 
various enactments like the Juvenile Justice Act, 200090, the Right to 
Education Act, 200991, the Protection of Children from Sexual 
Offences (POCSO) Act, 201292 etc. Even the Indian judiciary has 
identified the value of children and their best interest.93  
Insofar as child rights are concerned, India can learn from the 
South African experience. One important aspect is defining a child 
as an individual less than 18 years of age. This, in the context of free 
and compulsory education under Article 21A94, extends the benefits 
of free education to a greater number of individuals. Furthermore, 
providing a familial environment for a child could also help in 
ensuring all-round development that is not merely guaranteed by 
providing food, clothing, shelter or education. 
4. The Right to Life vis-à-vis the Right against Exploitation  
The framers of the Indian Constitution provided for the right 
against exploitation under Articles 23 and 24.95 Article 24 has been 
phrased in a manner very similar to Article 21, with the former 
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beginning with the word “no child below… ”96 and the latter with 
“no person shall…”97. However, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
understanding of both these Articles, the similarities end here. Not 
only has Article 2198 been conferred direct horizontal application99, 
but also its title ‘Protection of life and personal liberty’ has been 
interpreted in a much broader fashion than Article 24100. The right 
to life under Article 21101 has been held to inter alia include 
substantive rights, such as the right to go abroad, the right to 
education, right to health and medical aid, the right to shelter, the 
right against delayed execution, right to livelihood, the right to 
privacy, the right against custodial death, the right against solitary 
confinement, assistance from doctors, the right against public 
hanging and the right against being handcuffed.102 Even the non-
justiciable Directive Principles of State Policy such as right of every 
child to a full development103, protection of under-trial prisoners104, 
protection of one’s cultural heritage105 , and the right to pollution 
free water and air106 have been read into the ambit of Article 21. 
The rationale adopted to expand the scope of Article 21 has been of 
inherent importance with regards to the right of an individual to 
live a meaningful and dignified life.107 Thus, the Courts have over 
the years included more and more substantive rights under Article 
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21, as they considered them necessary for an individual to lead a 
dignified life. From the doctrinal research undertaken in this paper, 
it is apparent that the right against exploitation of children108 has 
not been conferred a wide interpretation. A contrario constitutional 
courts have, on multiple occasions, perceived Article 24109 as an 
instrument to guarantee the right to education of children.110 Why 
two similarly worded fundamental rights have been interpreted by 
the judiciary in such different ways, remains to be seen. The grave 
contrast between Articles 21111 and 24112 lies in the fact that the 
former is, by way of interpretation, a bearer of substantive rights 
and the latter is, again by way of interpretation, merely a way of 
supporting a substantive right under Article 21A113 i.e., the right to 
education. 
4.1. Expanding the Scope of Article 24  
The Right against Exploitation (Articles 23 and 24)114 under the 
Indian Constitution has two different aspects. Sub-clause (1) of 
Article 23115 states that: “Traffic in human beings and begar and 
other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any 
contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in 
accordance with law.”  
As far as the interpretation of this Article is concerned, in the 
PUDR case116, the Supreme Court found that it was applicable in a 
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direct horizontal fashion. It was also found that the scope of Article 
23117 is unlimited and any form of forced labour, paid or unpaid, 
was prohibited under it.118 The rationale for this prohibition was 
that any kind of forced labour would offend human dignity and no 
servitude can be allowed to exist in a country that upholds human 
rights.119 It is evident that the Court undertook a wider view of the 
right enumerated under Article 23120, to ensure that the spirit of the 
right against exploitation is upheld. The Court did not resort to 
limiting the types of labour that would fall under the prohibition; 
instead it acknowledged that any action that deprives a person of 
choice could be regarded as forced.121 Thus, the Supreme Court has 
previously indulged in expanding the scope of a right against 
exploitation, enumerated under Article 23. 
If the scope of interpretation of Article 24 is to be broadened, the 
various contours of the right must be determined. To begin with, it 
is imperative to determine what ‘exploitation’ exactly is. The 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘exploitation’ as - “The act of taking 
advantage of something, especially the act of taking unjust 
advantage of another for one's own benefit”122. Evidently, the 
extent of the definition of exploitation would not be limited to mere 
hazardous employment in factories, mines, etc. Borrowing the logic 
for expanded interpretation from Courts’ understanding of Article 
21123 and the precedent relating to expanding Article 23124, the right 
against exploitation of children also has a potential of expansion to 
include the myriad forms of workplace exploitation children are 
subjected to as domestic helps, agricultural labourers, etc. 
The Supreme Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India125 
has held that “when interpreting the provisions of the Constitution 
conferring fundamental rights, the attempt of the court should be 
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to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental rights rather 
than to attenuate their meaning and content”. Without an 
expansion of Article 24, the idea of children living a life free from 
exploitation would be a distant reality and thus, the right against 
exploitation of children would be rendered incomplete. In fact, as 
the current law stands, by reading the right against exploitation of 
children as a means to the end of ensuring education for children, 
this negative right becomes obsolete.  
Insofar as the importance of children is concerned, it has already 
been noted that, while tracing the jurisprudence surrounding 
Article 24, the Supreme Court has emphasized on the primal role 
children play in the country’s social progress, economic 
development, peace and order, etc.126 The legislature, too, has taken 
cognizance of the same and has introduced Article 21A127, amended 
Article 45128 and the Right to Education Act, 2009129 to cater to the 
educational needs of children in the country. That being said, the 
wording of the right under Article 24130, is specific and it deals only 
with ‘hazardous employment’ per se. This specific wording 
disallows expanding Article 24131 to the extent of the expansion 
conferred upon Article 21.132 
By way of purposive interpretation of Article 24133, however, the 
author identifies a possibility to expand the scope of the Article in a 
fashion that is in conformity with the basic idea behind the 
provision, i.e., to prevent the exploitation of children at workplaces. 
Thus, in keeping with the jurisprudence conferring immense 
importance to the rights of a child, it is only reasonable to expand 
the scope of the rights the children were conferred by the Drafters 
of the Constitution, to include myriad forms of workplace 
exploitations. The references to the C.R.C., recommendations of the 
I.L.O., the Irish Constitution, and the South African Bill of Rights 
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also substantiate the argument in favour of expanding the 
definition of Article 24. While the I.L.O. also suggests the expansion 
of the definition of ‘hazardous work’ to include work that exposes 
children to physical, psychological and/or sexual abuse134, the 
C.R.C. enumerates a plethora of rights, which children possess, and 
the corresponding duties to protect them lie primarily with the 
State. The Irish Constitution serves as an example of expanding the 
scope of a right ensuring protection of personal rights135, to include 
child rights and both the Irish Constitution136 and the South African 
Bill of Rights137 display clearly how important the rights of children 
have been viewed by other jurisdictions. The courts in India have 
played an instrumental role in expanding the scope of one’s 
fundamental rights to ensure that the intentions of the drafters of 
the Constitution are appropriately reflected. Thus, taking into 
account the basic premise behind Article 24, that is, to prevent the 
workplace exploitation of children, there is no reason to not allow 
the children of this country to be free from the vices of any kind of 
workplace exploitation, which robs them of their dignity as human 
beings. This also translates into the fact that Article 24138 cannot be 
a mere means to the end of guaranteeing education and must be 
allowed a wide, independent existence in order to tackle myriad 
forms of workplace exploitations of children. 
5. Conclusion  
This paper analyses in depth the fundamental right guaranteed 
under Article 24. It starts off with tracing the Supreme Court of 
India’s interpretation of the Article and concludes that, save certain 
exceptions, the Court has preferred vertically applying the right 
against exploitation under Article 24. The corresponding duty to 
respect the negative right has either not been expressly expanded 
to include private individuals, or simply confers a lesser degree of 
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responsibility on private parties. Moreover, the Court has also 
conflated education and Article 24 in a manner that the latter is an 
instrument in guaranteeing the former.139 The author also identifies 
that the case of Society of Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. 
Union of India140 provides for the current position of law pertaining 
to Article 24, i.e., a primary responsibility upon the State to protect 
the right and non-State actors expected to respect the right. 
In order to argue in favour of expanding the scope of Article 24, the 
author relies on the I.L.O. and the C.R.C., to conclude that the 
international community greatly emphasizes on the requirement of 
protecting rights of children. Additionally, as per the 
recommendations of the I.L.O., there is a possibility of expanding 
the definition of ‘hazardous work’. The Constitution of Ireland can 
be a guiding example, wherein special rights for children have been 
identified by the Irish Supreme Court under Article 40.3, which 
prima facie only guarantees the protection of civil rights.   
A comparison is drawn between Articles 21141 and 24142 wherein it 
is concluded that while the Supreme Court has expanded the ambit 
of the right to life to circumscribe more and more rights over the 
years, to ensure a more meaningful and dignified existence of a 
person, Article 24143 has been reduced to a mere instrument to 
guarantee the substantive right of education to children. The 
jurisprudence surrounding Article 23144 makes it amply clear that 
the Supreme Court has expanded the definition of ‘forced’ to 
include any kind of labour that deprives one of his/her right to 
freedom of occupation. The specific wording of Article 24 makes it 
impossible to interpret it broadly as it deals only with ‘hazardous 
employment’. However, purposive interpretation can be resorted 
to in order to expand the scope of Article 24 to include other forms 
of exploitations a child might face at his or her employment. This 
wider interpretation would free Article 24145 from the shackles of 
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being a mere instrument to ensure education of children and will 
grant it a scope that would better represent the basic premise 
behind including it in the Indian Constitution. 
 
